Report of the Humanitarian

and Fact-Finding Mission

to Maguindanao

25-30 November 2009

• Freedom Fund for Filipino Journalists
• National Union of Journalists of the Philippines
• MindaNews
• Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism

Report of the Humanitarian and Fact-Finding Mission to Maguindanao

of the Freedom Fund for Filipino Journalists

and the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines

Compiled and produced by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism,

MindaNews, and the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines

THE FACT-FINDING TEAM

The Freedom Fund for Filipino Journalists (FFFJ), a network of independent media organizations in the Philippines in partnership with the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), a mass organization of  journalists across the country, dispatched a humanitarian and Fact-Finding Team to Maguindanao from November 25 to 30, 2009 for two objectives:

• 1. Extend immediate humanitarian assistance to the reporters and media workers killed in the November 23, 2009 massacre; and
  2. Conduct an independent and fair documentation of what had happened.

The Team arrived in General Santos City two days after the massacre, and traveled around to the massacre site in Ampatuan, Maguindanao, the provincial capitol in Shariff Aguak, and the cities of Koronadal and Tacurong to interview witnesses, family members of the victims, investigators, and other government officials.

Established in 2001, the FFFJ provides financial assistance to the families of slain journalists, as well as legal support in the prosecution of their cases. Its founding members are the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR), Center for Community Journalism and Development (CCJD), Philippine Press Institute (PPI), Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), and the US-based newspaper Philippine News.

The biggest mass organization of journalists with 62 chapters across the Philippines, the NUJP is a full member of the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), which promotes international action to defend press freedom and social justice through strong, free and independent trade unions of journalists.

The Fact-Finding Mission was conducted in partnership with the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) and the Union of Peoples’ Lawyers in Mindanao (UPLM).

The Fact-Finding Team was composed of the following journalists and lawyers:

1. Rowena “Weng” C. Paraan, board member of the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines and Research Director of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism
2. Jaime “Nonoy” Espina, vice president of the NUJP
3. Ed Lingao, Multimedia Director of the PCIJ
4. Carol Arguillas, editor of MindaNews and member of the Advisory Council of NUJP-Davao
5. Froilan Gallardo, senior writer of MindaNews and NUJP Cagayan de Oro chapter

Others:

1. Atty. Prima Quinsayas, legal counsel of the FFFJ
2. Melanie Pinlac, secretariat coordinator of the FFFJ and staff of the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility
3. Atty. Manuel Quibod, president of the Free Legal Assistance Group-Davao chapter and dean of the Ateneo de Davao School of Law
4. Atty. Maan Lagare Academia, member of UPLM

Three other journalists who are members of the NUJP local chapters coordinated meetings with the family members and assisted the Fact-FindingTeam.

The Team also assisted and worked with the Philippines’ foremost forensics expert, Dr. Raquel Fortun (sister-in-law of Ampatuan lawyer Sigfried Fortun), who has been designated as a consultant on the Maguindanao case by the Commission on Human Rights, in cooperation with the FFFJ.

LIST OF MEDIA VICTIMS

The Fact-Finding Team interviewed local journalists and NUJP members, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, and family members of the victims – and visited the funeral parlors and wakes – to come up with a list of the reporters and media workers who were killed in the massacre.

The Fact-Finding Team verified that at least 30 media workers were killed, while another one remains missing, or more than half of the 57 confirmed fatalities.

As of Dec. 1, the list of 30 media fatalities of the massacre follows:

1.    Adolfo, Benjie, Gold Star Daily, Koronadal City

2.    Araneta, Henry, dzRH, General Santos City

3.    Arriola, Mc Delbert “Mac-Mac,” UNTV, General Santos City

4.    Bataluna, Rubello, Gold Star Daily, Koronadal City

5.    Betia, Arturo, Periodico Ini, General Santos City

6.    Cabillo, Romeo Jimmy, Midland Review, Tacurong City

7.    Cablitas, Marites, News Focus / dxDX, General Santos City

8.    Cachuela, Hannibal, Punto News, Koronadal City

9.    Caniban, John, Periodico Ini, General Santos City

10. Dalmacio, Lea, Socsargen News, General Santos City

11. Decina, Noel, Periodico Ini, General Santos City

12. Dela Cruz, Gina, Saksi News, General Santos City

13. Duhay, Jhoy, Gold Star Daily, Tacurong City

14. Evardo, Jolito, UNTV General Santos City

15. Gatchalian, Santos, DXGO, Davao City

16. Legarte, Bienvenido, Jr., Prontiera News, Koronadal City

17. Lupogan, Lindo, Mindanao Daily Gazette, Davao City

18. Maravilla, Ernesto “Bart,” Bombo Radyo, Koronadal City

19. Merisco, Rey, Periodico Ini, Koronadal City

20.  Montaño, Marife “Neneng,” Saksi News, General Santos City

21. Morales, Rosell, News Focus, General Santos City

22. Nuñez, Victor, UNTV, General Santos City

23. Perante, Ronnie, Gold Star Daily correspondent, Koronadal City

24. Parcon, Joel, Prontiera News, Koronadal City

25. Razon, Fernando “Ranny,” Periodico Ini, General Santos City

26. Reblando, Alejandro “Bong,” Manila Bulletin, General Santos City

27. Salaysay, Napoleon, Mindanao Gazette, Cotabato City

28. Subang, Francisco “Ian”, Socsargen Today, General Santos City

29. Teodoro, Andres “Andy,” Central Mindanao Inquirer, Tacurong City

30. Tiamson, Daniel, UNTV, General Santos City

MISSING, NOT YET IDENTIFIED

The Fact-Finding Team noted, however, that media worker Reynaldo “Bebot” Momay of the Midland Review, Tacurong City, remains missing. As well, the bodies of three more persons marked as “media” by the retrieval team had been recovered by the authorities but not yet identified by their relatives.

THE FACT-FINDING TEAM’S ACTIVITIES

Day 1 (November 25, 2009, Wednesday)

• Team members met in GenSan airport (Carol and Froilan drove from Davao, Weng and Nonoy flew from Manila) shortly before 9 am.
• Proceeded to a scheduled meeting with the Crisis Management Committee (CMC) head Secretary Jesus Dureza at the brigade HQ (601^st Philippine Army) in Tacurong. There were several journalists from local and national media already in the camp when the Team arrived and the originally private meeting became a Q and A session between Sec. Dureza and the other members of media. Dureza said nothing new actually except that something would happen soon, apparently referring to the “surrender” of Ampatuan the following day. But we did receive assurance from him that the Team would be updated on developments in the investigation. He invited us to attend a meeting with families at 2 pm in Koronadal and a press briefing afterward. He also arranged for someone to meet the Team at the massacre site.
• The Team proceeded to the massacre site (Sitio Masalay, Barangay Salman, Ampatuan town). Just before the Team arrived, the red Vios and UNTV vehicles had already been dug up. Six bodies were found while the Team was there, including the body of dzRH correspondent Henry Araneta, from the pit where the vehicles were also buried.
• Local residents interviewed confirmed seeing a huge number of armed men on the day of the massacre.
• The Team interviewed ground commander, Chief Superintendent Felicisimo Khu. The residents’ account of the timeline jibed with Khu’s timeline. Like Khu, the residents said they saw the convoy enter the area around 10 am.
• It was past 4 pm when the Team reached Koronadal and the meeting with families was over. The Team secured a copy from the Region 12 office of DSWD of the list of victims and representatives of their families. The list was not final, the Team was told. In fact, a lot of entries were inserted and hand-written. The Team compared it with the initial list of media victims that it had (based on Carol’s list, reports by NUJP locals and published reports). The Team came up with an initial list of 27 media personnel. DSWD people said relatives would be coming the following, most likely in the afternoon, to get death certificates. The Team requested DSWD to inform any arriving relatives of the victims that FFFJ and NUJP wished to speak with them.
• The Team proceeded to the candle-lighting program at Koronadal Plaza. Nonoy spoke for NUJP. More than 200 people composed of media members, students, and capitol employees listened to the speeches.

Day 2 (November 26, 2009, Thursday)

• The Team left early for Shariff Aguak for the “turnover” of Datu Unsay Andal Ampatuan Jr. to Presidential Adviser Jesus Dureza. The 10 am scheduled “turnover” was delayed and finally pushed through at 11:42 am.
• Ed tried to go to the massacre site for video documentation but was told by soldiers in the area that the recovery efforts had already been ended.
• The Team proceeded to the DSWD office for follow-up work with the families. But only relatives of two victims were there and they were not immediate family members. The Team could therefore not release the financial assistance to them. DSWD, though, gave an updated list of victims and families, and this time with 59 names that included 30 members of media. Some names, however, were either nicknames or were incomplete names, and had no indication of the victim’s media affiliation. The Team checked each name one by one to come up with a more complete list, with additional details.
• Weng met with local journalists to help facilitate the meeting with the victims’ families. Tasks on who would contact who were identified.
• Ed went to the autopsy site and a funeral parlor, and then met with Freddie Solinap, publisher of Periodico Ini. The weekly paper had lost its full complement of field/reportorial personnel during the massacre, since four of the paper’s staff of six had come along for the coverage. The surviving two staff members of the paper are admin/office personnel.
• The Team returned to General Santos City
• The Team secured data on briefing presentations for Defense Secretary Norberto Gonzales

Day 3 (November 27, 2009, Friday)

• The Team secured copies of vital documents, including reports of the investigators, and the affidavits of  Datu Esmael “Toto” Gaguil Mangudadatu,  Datu Ibrahim “Jong” Mangudadatu, Datu Freddie “Ogie”G. Mangudadatu and Datu Zajid “Dodong” G. Mangudadatu, Judge Mamasalanan, Basit T. Laguia, Sandaman Rajah Ali, the initial report of the National Bureau of Investigation, and minutes of the inquest proceedings on November 26, 2009. Minutes of Inquest Proceedings, 26 Nov ; Joint-Affidavit of Arrest of SA Manuel Sayre; SA Madrino de Jesus, Sgt. Eduardo Fr. Ramos, Jr.; SA Ariel Jonathan Contreras and SRA Czar Eric.
• The Team’s lawyers met to discuss legal steps to be taken and arrange for media coverage of the filing of the case on Tuesday (Monday, Nov. 30, being a holiday) and to ensure that the documents are filed with the court.
• The Team visited the victims’ families in General Santos City, and spoke with their relatives at the funeral homes.
• The Team interviewed reporters who were supposed to have joined the trip to Maguindanao on November 23 but who decided against doing so at the last minute.
• Forensics expert Dr. Raquel Fortun arrives in General Santos City and is given a general briefing by the Fact-Finding Team on their initial findings.

Day 4 (November 28, 2009, Saturday)

• The Team proceeded to Koronadal to meet with 12 families of the slain media members held at the Public Information Office of the capitol building. Only 11 families arrived and were given financial assistance by the FFFJ.
• The Team returned to General Santos City and at the Collado Funeral Parlor met with family members and friends of five media victims, in particular (Cablitas, Dela Cruz, Bataluna, Adolfo, Morales).
• Atty. Quinsayas met for the second time with PD Leo Dacera.
• Ed and Dr Fortun visited the massacre site and met with representatives of the Commission on Human Rights.
• Ed and Dr Fortun went to see the vehicles of the victims that have been impounded at the police “evidence yard” in General Santos City.

Day 5 (November 29, 2009, Sunday)

• The Team proceeded to Sto. Niño, South Cotabato to meet with the family of Henry Araneta.
• The Team went to Tacurong City to meet with families of Bebot Momay and Andres Teodoro (Melay and Froilan).
• Atty. Quinsayas met with the prosecution panel in GenSan.

Day 6 (November 30, 2009, Monday)

• The Team met with family of Mc Delbert Arriola at UNTV GenSan office.
• At the airport, the Team received a text message from Arriola’s father that the CIDG had called families of victims.

The Team learned that the families of two victims have decided to files cases. Post-mortem reports have been done for only five media workers:

OBSERVATIONS OF THE TEAM

1. Poor handling and contamination of the massacre site

Five days after the massacre, when the Fact-Finding Team visited on November 28, the scene of the crime remained heavily littered with rubbish, and possibly the personal effects and the remains of the victims. There was even what appeared to be a tuft of long hair on the ground that could have been a piece of scalp. The police scene of crime operatives (SOCO) had placed yellow police line tape only around the immediate perimeter of the massacre site, but not on the road leading to it. The site did not look like a protected scene at all. The Team even saw used SIM cards – from the suspects or from responding police and soldiers- on the ground.

The retrieval team from the military and police was clearly assigned to achieve only one task: get the bodies out. There was little or no consideration given to preserving the evidence. There was little or no consideration given to avoid the contamination of the crime scene.

1. Poor handling of the remains

The use of a backhoe (not the one allegedly used by the accused) compromised the site and the remains. In addition, the backhoe may have ended up adding to the physical trauma on the bodies. An indication of the carelessness shown in handling the bodies was the fluctuating body count that the authorities gave. For a while, the authorities could not agree on how many bodies there were.

In interviews, members of the retrieval team from the military and police admitted that they had to rush their work and pull out of the site before dark set in because the situation on the first four days was still tenuous, and they had wanted to avoid possible retaliation from the suspects. The retrieval team had chosen to use a backhoe, instead of shovels, to retrieve the bodies precisely to rush the effort.

1. The apparent preference for testimonial rather than physical evidence

The authorities have been gathering a lot of testimonies, but showed less emphasis to securing physical evidence. Three affidavits submitted by prosecutors against the Ampatuans were allegedly from the passengers of the last vehicle that got separated from the convoy. Their affidavits had too many phrases in common, such as “I and my companions went out of the car to urinate” and “We were threatened to see Datu Unsay approaching the first vehicle.”

Some affidavits submitted to the prosecutors stated that the diggings and pit where the bodies were buried had been prepared a week earlier, or days before the Nov. 23, 2009 massacre.

According to ground command C/Supt Khu, only one cell phone was recovered from the massacre site, and no other equipment or gadget that the media workers and the other fatalities might have carried with them.

1. CAFGU Detachment, “MNLF Camp” near the site

The victims’ convoy was stopped by the suspects just about 300 meters from a detachment of the CAFGU (Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units that are under the command of the military). During the initial military search, the CAFGUs claimed that no such convoy had passed by, even though the blockade occurred in a dip in the road clearly visible to the CAFGU detachment. The army cadre in charge of the detachment discreetly signaled to searchers that the convoy had turned into the side road. The CAFGUs are under interrogation.

While both are militia forces, CAFGUs and CVOs (civilian volunteer organization) have different command structures. CVOs, including barangay tanods, are under the command of local government officials.

Just 50 meters down the road leading to the massacre site there is an area marked as “MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) camp.”  It was empty when the Fact-Finding Team arrived but the adjacent houses looked well kept.

1. Vehicle/s allegedly used by suspects still unaccounted for

Investigators said the suspects also used a Nissan Frontier pickup with police markings. One such police vehicle issued to the Maguindanao police is still unaccounted for. This jibes with claims by the Mangudadatus’ witnesses that police vehicles were involved in the blockade.

6. Fear grips residents near the site, and seems to prevent them from speaking out

There are many houses, even a mosque, located around the massacre site. Because the site is on a hilltop, anyone in those houses would have seen the massacre, assuming that they were there at the time. Whether or not they would be willing to talk about what they could have seen is another question.

1. Enormous weapons arsenal of the Ampatuans not fully confiscated

The Ampatuans had surrendered a lot of old firearms such as Garands and Carbines but are known to have large arsenals of modern weapons. The initial police investigation showed that the victims were shot by six Armalite rifles, an M-14 rifle, an AK-47, and a shotgun. The police reports made no mention of injuries caused by a Garand or a Carbine.

The police had seized two heavy armored cars owned by the Ampatuans that were armed with multiple 50-caliber machine guns. The vehicles look like World War 2-type half-tracks [except they have wheels] that have half-inch armor plates. These armored cars were painted in camouflage and stamped with the words Pulisya and Shariff Aguak or Maguindanao police, even though they are not official police vehicles. In fact they do not even have any attachment points for license plates. It is not clear if appropriate charges were filed against the Ampatuans for these armored cars. The police also say that the 50-caliber machine guns had tampered serial numbers.

1. Road leads to nowhere?

The road to the massacre site is a road for four-wheel vehicles. Yet the road leads to   nowhere, and ends at the massacre site. Also, no one in the area clearly owns any vehicle. The pit where the bodies were buried might have been dug up days before the massacre occurred, according to the retrieval team members.

9.  Imperative to disarm all clans, political families in the area

Apart from the Ampatuans, the Mangudadatus are widely held to be in command of         their own private army.  The two families were, until last year, close allies. One journalist quotes some residents as saying, “Walang pinagkaiba ang mga iyan.” Toto Mangudadatu filed his certificate of candidacy escorted by scores of armed escorts, according to television news reports of the event. In a visit to his family house in Buluan City, the Team saw civilians carrying high-powered firearms, some of them of unknown make and caliber, indicating that these could not possibly be government-issue firearms.

10. Missing or still undisclosed documents

More than a week after the massacre, and days after the Department of Justice had reportedly filed seven counts of murder charges against Andal Ampatuan Jr., the authorities have yet to publicly release vital documents, including the police case referral report (which should contain a summary of the evidence and findings of the investigator, and serve as basis for the prosecution of the case/s).

As important, there are no publicly available copies of any other presidential issuances covering the grant of so-called “blanket authority” for Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno to deal with the “state of emergency” in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.  What has been uploaded on the website of the Office of the Press Secretary is just a six-paragraph Presidential Proclamation No. 1946 dated November 24, 2009, which does not spell out the broad powers supposedly vested in Puno by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, according to her Press Secretary Cerge Remonde.

The “blanket authority” granted to Puno is not contained in any presidential issuances on record. It was just discussed in a press release of the Office of the Press Secretary and in press statements of Remonde.

11. Government resources used to fly Andal Ampatuan Jr. and his lawyer Sigfried Fortun

The WPP’s Team said government used an Air Force aircraft to fly in Ampatuan’s lawyer Sigfried Fortun from Cotabato City to General Santos City, after Ampatuan refused to avail himself of the services of a public attorney. What this means is that the government spent government resources to fly in the private lawyer of the man it is charging with multiple counts of murder.

12. Government response to the situation has not fully eased the anxiety and fear of  the residents and media workers in the affected areas;  the threats to the safety  and security of the communities linger, especially with the forthcoming elections  likely to fire up the tension between partisan rivals and political clans

National media coverage of the situation has inordinately focused on the rivalry for  political power between the clans, inchoate images of the tragedy, and disjointed  statements from the investigators, Malacanang officials, and political partisans. Little  attention has been given to the gaps in the work of the police, investigators, and  prosecutors.

The massacre claimed nearly an entire generation of journalists from the small print  and broadcast communities of General Santos, Koronadal City, and nearby areas. At  least 22 of the 31 fatalities were married and had children, indicating an enormous need  for continuing humanitarian assistance.